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To Secede or Not Secede? Is It Even Possible?
T. ZACHARY COOK*

INTRODUCTION
Secession seems like a concept of the past. In our increasingly
globalizing world, nationalism was growing archaic and halting
progress. But secession has seen a surge in the last ten years. Kosovo
declared independence from Serbia in 2008. The United Kingdom
seceded from the European Union in the infamous "Brexit." And in
2017, Catalonia's grab for independence sparked the worst crisis in
Spain since the days of Francisco Franco.1 Alongside these high-profile
secessions, smaller movements, which until now were simply brewing
and bubbling, are becoming inspired. One such movement is "The South
is My Country," a coalition of three southern Brazilian states that wish
to secede from Brazil.
This paper will examine the Brazilian separatist movement. After
introducing the movement and the history of modern Brazil in Part I,
Part II will examine what Brazilian law has to say on secession with the
Catalan crisis as a comparison. Part III will attempt to navigate the
murky waters of international law to determine whether a group such
as "The South is My Country" has a right to unilaterally secede.
I.

BRAZILIAN BACKGROUND

A. Highlights of Modern BrazilianHistory
The past seventy years of Brazilian history are full of conflict,
coups, and humanitarian issues. In 1954, the Vargas Era ended with
Gettilio Vargas's suicide, and for the next ten years, the threat of a coup

* Articles Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 26; J.D. Candidate 2019,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A.2016, Taylor University.
1. See Angela Dewan, CataloniaDecides: Spain's Trouble Region Votes in Knife-Edge
Election, CNN (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/21/europe/cataloniaelection-day-spain-independence-intl/index.html.
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loomed over Brazils leadership. 2 In 1964 that threat became a reality.
Growing dissatisfaction with President Joao Goulart, a far leftist,
prompted the military to take control of the government and create a
dictatorship. 3 From the military's perspective, it was finally correcting
its recurring error of withdrawing troops before a coup created lasting
4
change.
Under the military-appointed presidents, the Brazilian government
cracked down hard on leftism. The dictatorship was overtly anticommunist and treated prior left-leaning leaders as personae non
gratae. 5 The government preached undying loyalty, suspended habeas
corpus, and institutionalized torture of political undesirables (with help
from the United States, no less). 6 The Brazilian Catholic Church
uncovered details about the dictatorship's actions. They found that onethird of the people the government arrested were students, labor
activists, clergymen, and journalists. 7 And yet, many Brazilians were
willing to put up with the dictatorship's abuses in exchange for the
8
stability and economic gains it achieved.
The dictatorship began to wane in the mid-1970s during the term
of President General Ernesto Geisel. 9 Frustrated by the difficulty of
maintaining the dictatorship, the armed forces announced they would
gradually restore civilian government. By 1985, civilians were fully in
control of the government once more.1 0 The constitution that Brazil
currently uses was created in 1988; however, this constitution has a
dissonance between the ideals it sets for Brazil and the practical
application of those ideals.
As Teresa Meade, author of A Brief History of Brazil, puts it, "On
paper, the 1988 Constitution is one of the most far-reaching progressive
documents passed by any government."1 She has ample reason to think
so. Article 5 of the constitution proclaims, among many other things:
equality before the law, equal rights for men and women, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, a right to privacy, and a right to be free
from torture. 12 Articles 6 and 7 set out social and labor rights, including

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

ROBERT M. LEVINE, THE HISTORY OF BRAZIL 122 (1999).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 124-26.
at 127.
at 129.
at 135.
at 136.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. TERESA A. MEADE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZIL 178 (2d ed. 2010).
12. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, tit. I, art. 5.
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education and social security,1 3 paid maternity and paternity leave, and
non-discrimination in wages. 1 4 In general, the constitution weakened
the executive branch while strengthening the legislative and judicial
branches. 15
However, in practice, this progressive constitution does not go very
far. The constitution was written by 559 members of the Brazilian
Congress and, as a result, is better at exhibiting diverse thought than it
is at being an effective instrument of government. 16 The variety of goals
and opinions in Congress created fragmentation that crippled
Congress's ability to implement the broad economic and social policies of
the constitution; now, only the weakened executive can effectively carry
those out.17 In addition, the constitution lacks checks and balances. 18
Ultimately, the old political system remained in place, which created
more opportunities for corruption and hindered the social change that
the constitution sought. 19

B. What is "The South is My Country?"
The separatist movement known as "The South is My Country" got
its start in 1992 in the state of Santa Catarina. 20 The movement's chief
grievances were a lack of representation in the Brazilian Congress,
government corruption, uneven taxation, and unemployment. 21 The
movement's stance has not changed inits twenty-five years of existence.
The group's goal is for the three southernmost states of Brazil-Paran,
Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul-to secede from the nation of
Brazil and form their own country.
While ParanA and Santa Catarina are tied to the movement, Rio
Grande do Sul has historical precedent for the movement. Rio Grande
do Sul is very close to Uruguay and Argentina, which made it a buffer
zone between the Spanish and Portuguese Empires during their

13. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, tit. I, art. 6.
14. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, tit. I, art. 7.

15. Meade, supra note 11, at 178.
16. Id.
17. LEVINE, supra note 2, at 151.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 138-39.
20. Paula Sperb, In Informal Referendum, 95% Vote for the Separation of the South
Region from the Rest of Brazil, FOLHA DE S. PAULO (Oct. 5, 2016, 11:05 AM),
http://www 1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2016/1 /1820048-in-informalreferendum-95-vote-for-the- separation-of-the-south-region-from -the-rest-of-brazil. shtml.
21. See NowThis World, Could South Brazil Become Its Own Country?, YouTUBE (Oct.
24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-rnZlcvQnUTk.
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conquests of South America. 22 In 1835, the Farroupilha Revolution
broke out, a revolt sparked by, of all things, the beef jerky trade. 23 Aided
by the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi, Rio Grande do Sul was
able to achieve independence for a short while, 24 until the
revolutionaries surrendered in 1845.25 While it was ultimately defeated,
the people of Rio Grande do Sul's capital city, Porto Alegre, hold strong
26
nostalgic feelings for the event.
"The South is My Country," like the Farroupilha Revolution before
it, has an economic component to it. The region is prosperous; it has a
Human Development Index of 0.83, which is significantly higher than
Brazil's score and in the realm of Chile, the highest scoring country in
Latin America. 27 This prosperity is reflected in the region's taxation.
The northeastern Brazilian state of Bahia pays less than half of the
federal taxes that Rio Grande do Sul pays despite having a much larger
population. 28 For "The South is My Country," that inequality is part of
the problem.
The separatists also claim that southern Brazil is culturally
distinct from the rest of Brazil. While most of Brazil is a melting pot of
African, Asian, European, and indigenous peoples, the southernmost
states are considerably more European. 29 These three states have a
history of German, Italian, and Slavic immigration, 30 to the point that
almost 80 percent of the population is ethnically European. 31 Several
southern cities speak German and hold German traditions, such as the
renowned Oktoberfest. 32 This cultural distinction may play a part in the
separatist movement's feeling that the Brazilian government is unfairly
overrun with representatives from the northeast and Amazon regions. 33
As one southerner put it, "If you hear the accent of the political
34
legislature of Brazil it is a north-eastern one."
22. See Gerald Lynch, Insight I No Country for Southern Men, WIDE ORBITS (Jan. 12,
2017), http://wideorbits.com/life/no-country-for-southern-men/.
23. In fairness to the people of 1800s Rio Grande do Sul, American colonists started an
uprising over tea about sixty years prior.
24. BBC, Brazilians in the South asked to vote on secession, 8 October 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41541063 [hereinafter Brazilians]; Lynch,
supra note 22.
25. Lynch, supranote 22.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. NowThis World, supra note 21.
29. Id.
30. See Lynch, supranote 22.
31. NowThis World, supra note 21.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Brazilians, supra note 24.
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This feeling of disunity ties in to Brazil's perspective on citizenship
and rights. For many Brazilians, citizenship and rights depend on
relationships. 35 Being a Brazilian citizen means knowing your place; "he
doesn't know his place" is considered an insult. 36 However, due to the
complications and inefficiencies of the 1988 constitution, Brazil has not
applied the rights of its citizens universally, which may cast doubt on
exactly what a person's place is. 37 Many young Brazilians see rights as
something earned by conforming to the expectations of the majority; in
other words, citizenship does not grant rights, it is merely a sign that
you have rights. 38 Influential citizens are given softer punishments for
breaking the law. 39 Citizens who fall lower on the social ladder are
ambivalent about their relationship to the state, and Brazil's history of
aggressive and harmful patriotism during the military dictatorship does
not assuage those concerns.4 0 Given the social, economic, and cultural
differences between the southern states and the rest of Brazil, it is
reasonable to say that the southerners are concerned about their rights
and their place in the system. If that is the case, it is no wonder that
some southerners wish to strike out on their own.

II. THE CATALAN CONNECTION: LAWS OF THE STATE
Catalonia's quest for independence is a long-running one. Catalonia
was a territory in Aragon that became part of Spain upon the marriage
of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1453.41 At first, Catalonia remained
autonomous, but in 1716, its status as a state was completely revoked
following the War of Spanish Succession. 4 2 Francisco Franco's rule did
nothing to help Catalan matters. In fact, Franco did quite the opposite:
Catalonians were forbidden from speaking their native language or
expressing any cultural identity.4 3 It was not until after the Franco
regime that Catalan autonomy was brought back as a concept. The 1978
Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy restored both
Spanish democracy and Catalan autonomy, but the region has been
35. LEVINE, supra note 2, at 153.

36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 153-54.
38. Id. at 156.

39. Id. at 154.
40. Id. at 156.
41. Thomas Y. Patrick, Note, The Zeitgeist of Secession Amidst the March Towards
Unification: Scotland, Catalonia,and the Future of the European Union, 39 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP.
42.
43.
CoMP.

L. REV. 195, 202 (2016).
Id.
Maria Garcia Barcia, Note, Catalonia: The New EuropeanState?, 20 ILSAJ INT'L &
L 399, 400-401 (2014).
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craving full independence ever since. 44
Catalonia's attempt to secede from Spain is relevant here for two
reasons. First, Catalonia's situation shares important similarities with
"The South is My Country," although the situations are not perfect
parallels. Second, the resurgence of The South is My Country" seems to
be linked to Catalonia's October 2017 referendum. 45 The timing and
similarity of both referendums points to "The South is My Country"
being inspired by Catalonia.
46
A. A Brief Overview of the Catalan Crisis

In 2006, Spain passed a statute giving Catalonia much more power
and autonomy, even defining it as a nation, but this was revoked by the
Spanish government in 2010. 4 7 Economic downturns exacerbated
Catalonian unrest. Catalonia was yet another victim of the 2008 stock
market crash, 48 and by 2014, Catalonia's unemployment rate jumped to
24.45 percent, with 43 percent youth unemployment. 49 Some
Catalonians espoused the feeling that the Spanish government was
taking far more than it was giving. In 2014, Catalonia paid roughly €10
billion more to the central government than it received. 50 In addition,
Spain's investment in Catalonia has dropped from 16 percent of the
national budget in 2003 to 9.5 percent in 2015.51
In October of 2017, the Catalonian Parliament held an illegal
referendum, asking the people whether they wanted to secede from
Spain. 52 Of the 43 percent of Catalonians who voted, 90 percent backed
independence. 53 The referendum attracted additional attention from the
attempted suppression of voters that involved a use of force eerily
reminiscent of the Franco days. 54 Bolstered by the referendum's results,
the Catalonian Parliament declared independence from Spain on
44. Patrick, supra note 41, at 203.
45. See BBC, Catalonia Crisis in 300 Words (June 2, 2018), http://www.bbc.com
/news/world-europe-41584864 [hereinafter Catalonia300]; see also LYNCH, supra note 22.
46. For a more detailed examination of the crisis before 2017, see generally Barcia,
supra note 42.
47. BBC, From Autonomy to Independence: Catalonia's Bid for Independence from
Spain uia Parliamentary Democracy, THE ETHIOPIA OBSERVATORY https://ethiopia
observatory.com/2017/12/25/from-autonomy-to-independence-catalonias-bid-forindependence-from-spain-via-parliamentary-democracy/ [hereinafter Catalonia'sBid].
48. See id.
49. Patrick, supra note 41, at 203.
50. Catalonia'sBid, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. Dewan, supra note 1.
53. Catalonia300, supra note 45.
54. See Catalonia'sBid, supra note 47; see also Dewan, supra note 1.
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October 27, 2017.
The Spanish government, understandably, did not take this well.
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy invoked Article 155 of the Spanish
Constitution, 56 which allows the Spanish government to take necessary
measures to ensure that an autonomous region complies with
government interests. 57 The government sacked the leaders of the
Catalonian Parliament and called for a snap election in hopes of
58
creating a new Catalonian government that disfavored independence.
The Spanish government's hopes were dashed. No single party won
enough seats for a majority, and the pro-independence parties had a
combined majority despite receiving only 8 percent of the popular vote. 59
But with Catalonian authority revoked via Article 155, the unionist
Popular Party-despite receiving 4 percent of the vote-is in control of
the region until a coalition government can be established.6 0 The most
likely outcome is that the pro-independence parties will form a coalition
government, which will put the Spanish government back to square

one.61

B. Comparingand Contrastingthe Secession Movements
In many ways, the independence movements in Catalonia and
southern Brazil are very similar. To begin with, both regions are
wealthy, especially when compared to the rest of their respective
countries. Both regions feel that their governments are requiring them
to pay out far more than the regions receive. Also, both movements have
utilized illegal referendums to gauge their populations' interest in
secession. As we shall see in the next section, both regions are faced
with similar constitutional challenges to their prospective secessions,
neither of which looks particularly promising. And finally, both regions

55. Catalonia'sBid, supra note 47.
56. "If an Autonomous Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by
the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way seriously prejudicing the general interests
of Spain, the Government ... may, following approval granted by an absolute majority of
the Senate, take the measures necessary in order to compel the latter forcibly to meet said
obligations, or in order to protect the above-mentioned general interests." SPANISH
CONSTITUTION, Dec. 27, 1978, art. 155, para 1.
57. See generally Catalonia's Bid, supra note 47 (illustrating cases in which the
constitutional court took measures to limit Catalonian independence).
58. Catalonia300, supra note 45.
59. Sebastiaan Faber & B6cquer Seguin, Catalonia's Elections Take Spain Back to
Square One, THE NATION (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/cataloniaselections-take-spain-back-to-square-one/.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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have a culture, ethnicity, and language different from the rest of their
respective countries.
However, the differences between the movements are important.
With the suppression of voters during the October 2017 referendum,
pro-independence Catalans have evoked the specter of Francisco Franco
and all the human rights baggage that accompanies him. By contrast,
despite Brazil's recent history of human rights abuses, "The South is My
Country" has not faced the kind of suppression that Catalan secession
has. Part III demonstrates that the presence or lack of human rights
issues can be an important factor in secession at the international level.
Another international-level difference is that, should Catalonia's bid for
independence be successful, the nation will have to deal with European
Union membership (or lack thereof) in addition to United Nations
membership and international recognition. Although still significant
hurdles, "The South is My Country" need only worry about membership
in the United Nations and international recognition.
C. ConstitutionalChallenges to Secession
Before examining the prospects of secession at the international
level, it is prudent to look at Brazil and Spain's approaches to secession.
Title I, Article I of the Brazilian Constitution refers to the states as an
"indissoluble union."6 2 With very little else to say on the matter, the
63
Brazilian Constitution seems to shut the door on secession.
Theoretically, the constitution could be changed to allow secession. Title
II, Article 14 provides that, "[t]he sovereignty of the people shall be
exercised by universal suffrage, and by direct and secret voting, with
equal value for all, and, according to the law, by means of (I) plebiscite;
(II) referendum; (III) people's initiative."6 4 However, this requires both
popular support and an acknowledgment from the Brazilian
government, and "The South is My Country" has neither.
The Brazilian government forbade "The South is My Country" from
referring to its referendums as "plebiscites" for fear that the legal
implications of the term would give voters the wrong idea.6 5 In addition,
the organizers of the referendum were forbidden from holding the vote
62.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, tit. I, art. 1.
63. See Sperb, supra note 20 (interpreting the constitution to mean separation is illegal
under title I, article 1); see also Lynch, supra note 22 (interpreting the constitution to
mean secession is illegal); see also Brazilians, supra note 24 (stating secession is forbidden
under the constitution).
64. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, tit. II, art.
14.
65. Lynch, supranote 22.
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on the same day as a municipal election. 66 Therefore, it is unwise to
assume that the recent referendums in Brazil were anything other than
experimental. Fortunately, "The South is My Country" seemed to accept
that. The informal nature of its most recent referendum (organized
roughly one week after Catalonia's October 2017 vote) suggests that
"The South is My Country" only wishes to gauge citizens' interest in
secession. 67
"The South is My Country's" other concern is support. While 95.75
percent of the referendum voted in favor of secession,6 8 that figure is
deceptively large. Only 617,543 people participated in the referendum,
so 95 percent of voters, in this case, is about 3 percent of southern
Brazil.6 9 Given these factors, the likelihood of "The South is My
Country" ever getting far enough in the secession process to worry about
United Nations membership and international recognition is very low.
Catalonia does not fare much better. Like Brazil, Spain's
constitution refers to its territories and states as an "indissoluble
unity."70 That same article generously guarantees autonomy of its
various regions. 7 1 Additional provisions under Part IX of the
constitution allow regions such as Catalonia to pass statutes of
autonomy, but not declare independence.7 2 Like "The South is My
Country," Catalonia lacks popular support, though not to the extent of
the Brazilian movement. Many Catalans are satisfied with autonomy;
they see being a cultural nation as more important than being a
sovereign nation.7 3 In fact, Michael J. Kelly, author of Political
Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-Determination, and the
Movement Towards Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, suspects
that relinquishing more autonomy for the region might quell the
4
separatist elements altogether.7
Here ends the analysis of what is. For many international players,
this is as far as is necessary to go. But this paper has the ambition to go
beyond what is and venture into the realm of what could be. For the
sake of further discussion, let us assume that "The South is My
Country" (and Catalonia) seceded, regardless of Brazil's or Spain's laws.
66. Id.
67. Brazilians, supra note 24.
68. Sperb, supra note 20.
69. Id.
70. SPANISH CONSTITUTION, Dec. 27, 1978, prelim. part, art. 2.
71. Id.
72. See SPANISH CONSTITUTION, Dec. 27, 1978, art. 134-48.
73. Michael J. Kelly, Article: Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of SelfDetermination, and the Movement Towards Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47
Drake L. Rev. 209, 232 (1999).
74. See id.
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What would await them on the international stage? What legal hurdles
would "The South is My Country" have to overcome, and what are the
odds of it doing so? The next section of this paper seeks to answer those
questions.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SECESSION

To say that international law is ambiguous about secession is a
gross understatement. The United Nations Charter has no explicit rule
affirming or denying a right to secede. 75 The subject has proven to be too
complicated for a general, bright-line rule, and so the United Nations
appears to tolerate ambiguity in this field of international law. 76 Even
the concept of secession, particularly its ties to other concepts of
international law such as self-determination and international
recognition, is complicated. To make the discussion of international law
as simple as possible, the first point will focus on the applicability of
international law to non-states.
A. What is Subject to InternationalLaw?
There is a debate as to whether non-states are covered by
international law. Scholars such as Michael J. Kelly argue that such
entities are not covered. International law, Kelly claims, is based on
how nation-states relate to each other. 77 Sub-states (minority groups
within a state) do not take part in this relationship, and therefore,
78
international law is not the forum in which they should speak.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has not recognized a
sub-state's claim for self-determination. 79 In a strange twist, not being
covered by international law could mean that secession does not violate
international law, and the group seceding would not be covered by it.8O
However, in its decision on Kosovo, the International Court of Justice
made it clear that declarations of independence could violate

75. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 Int'l Legal Materials 1340 (Can. 1998), in
Mark Weston Janis & John E. Noyes, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 521
(4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Janis & Noyes].
76. John Dugard, A Legal Basis for Secession Relevant Principles and Rules, in
SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFLICT AVOIDANCE: REGIONAL APPRAISALS 91

(Julie
77.
78.
79.

Dahlitz, ed., 2003).
Kelly, supra note 73, at 222.
Id.
Id.

80. MARC WELLER, ESCAPING THE SELF-DETERMINATION TRAP 15 (2008).
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international law.
On the other side of the debate, scholars such as Christopher 0.
Quaye argue that statehood is not required to be covered by
international law. United Nations covenants from 1966 emphasize
individual rights such as freedom of speech and a right to education;
why protect individual rights if individuals are not covered by
international law? 82 Quaye also notes the focus on individuals in cases
such as the Nuremberg Trials and United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153
(1820),83 to support his argument. 84 Finally, Quaye adds that the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations clearly provides that the legal concept
of self-determination may apply to secessions but qualifies his point
85
with the fact that this declaration is not absolute.
Another question arises from the use of the word "peoples." Article
1(2) of the United Nations Charter provides that one purpose of the
United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples." 8 6 What exactly is meant by the word "peoples?"
There are two schools of thought on the answer to this question.
The first, led by Emerson and Eagleton, claims that "peoples" refers to
colonized peoples. 87 This definition will be important later, as secessions
in the colonial context are treated differently than secessions outside
that context. 88 Quaye argues that this interpretation of "peoples"
nullifies the use of the word elsewhere in the charter and several other
United Nations documents. 89 Quaye also notes that general literature is
neither silent nor totally supportive of this interpretation. 90
The second school of thought is led by Chowdhury and Nayar. They
claim that "peoples" refers to all peoples, within or without a State. 9 1 In
addition, the beneficiaries of self-determination are the people
themselves, within a defined territory (not the territory they belong

81. Theodore Christakis, The ICJAdvisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has InternationalLaw
Something to Say About Secession?, LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 73, 73 (2011).
82. CHRISTOPHER 0. QUAYE, LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1991).
83. In United States v. Smith, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to
determine whether the crew of a ship called The Creollo committed piracy. The Court
found that the defendants had committed piracy "as defined by the law of nations." Smith
at 183.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 33.
86. U.N. Charter art. 1, 2.
87. QUAYE, supra note 82, at 218.
88. Janis & Noyes, supra note 75, at 521.
89. QUAYE, supra note 82, at 218.
90. Id. at 222.
91. Id. at 219.
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to).92 Accordingly, the principle of self-determination has universal
application.9 3
While each view has its proponents and support, the United
Nations seems to lean toward the Emerson/Eagleton interpretation. As
we will see later, the United Nations recognizes three main limits to
secession and self-determination. One of those limits is that "peoples"
refers to all the people in a state, as opposed to ethnic groups. 94 This
limit goes against the Chowdhury/Nayar interpretation because it does
not account for subdivisions of a nation's population the way that
Chowdhury and Nayar do.
B. What is Self-Determination?
The concept of self-determination is deeply entwined with issues of
secession to the point where it is very difficult to discuss one without the
other. Some believe that this should not necessarily be the case.
Scholars such as Marc Weller argue that it is possible for a new state to
come into being via secession without having a right to selfdetermination. 95 However, a state that comes into being through mere
effectiveness (de facto but not de jure) may face forced reincorporation
96
into the original state.
Self-determination is hard to define, partially because different
groups mean different things by it. In the early 1900s, selfdetermination was closely tied to independent states rising from the
ashes of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in the wake of
World War 1. 9 7 In the mid-1900s, it meant independence for previously
colonized nations. 98 Toward the end of the century, self-determination
came to mean one of three things: independence for states emerging
from the collapse of the Soviet Union, independence for homogenous
sub-units within states, or greater internal autonomy for smaller subunits within states. 99 Today, the international community agrees that
some form of self-determination exists, but it has yet to give it a
significant meaning in the post-colonial context. 100
Self-determination can be viewed through two other lenses:

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Dugard, supranote 76, at 92.
WELLER,

supra note 80, at 15.

Id. at 16.
See Kelly, supra note 73, at 221.
Id.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 220.
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internal and external. A right to internal self-determination refers to
provincial autonomy within an existing state, and the political, civil,
and social rights that accompany that autonomy.1 01 External selfdetermination refers to the right to separate from an existing state to
form a new, independent state.1 02 Woodrow Wilson championed this
view of self-determination, although his view of external selfdetermination was freedom from foreign rule. 103
Finally, there is the matter of how the United Nations Charter
Article 1(2) refers to self-determination. The way the United Nations
uses the word is not necessarily the layman's way.1 04 According to
James Crawford, a professor of international law at the University of
Cambridge, the United Nations' use of the word can have one of two
meanings. The first is the right of the people of a state to choose their
own form of government without external intervention.1 05 The second
meaning is the right of a specific territory to choose its form of
government irrespective of the rest of the state's wishes. 106 According to
Crawford, the United Nations Charter gravitates toward the first
definition. 107 Although the second definition may be implicitly supported
elsewhere in the charter, United Nations resolutions that declare that
definition-such as the Friendly Relations Declaration-overstep their
bounds in doing so. 108
From these numerous approaches, we may synthesize a working
definition of self-determination. From Kelly's article, we can gather that
self-determination has a different meaning depending on the context in
which it arises. The three scenarios Kelly lists-emerging from the
collapse of a larger state, independence for sub-states, and autonomy for
sub-states--can fit into the subcategories of internal and external selfdetermination. The first two scenarios can be considered external selfdetermination, and the last scenario can be considered internal selfdetermination. 109 The United Nations Charter's uses of the term also fit
into the "internal vs. external" dynamic. But Crawford's observation
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adds the insight that the United Nations, and international law by
extension, focuses primarily on external self-determination.
The "internal vs. external" dichotomy of self-determination is the
best way to think of the concept considering the various interpretations.
Traditionally, external self-determination has been the focus of
international law.
C. Self-Determination and Secession
Now that we have a less abstract concept of self-determination, we
can properly examine its relationship to secession. Secession, in contrast
to self-determination, is much easier to define: unilateral withdrawal of
part of an existing state from the rest of that state, without the original
state's consent. 110
Does the right to self-determination come with a right to secession?
Just as international law provides no explicit definition of selfdetermination, it is also silent on a right to secession. 1 1 Why does it
matter? According to Marc Weller, "an entity that can invoke the right
to self-determination can secede, and it is legally privileged during that
process." 112 Weller notes that secession without self-determination is
possible but does not provide the privilege that self-determination
does. 113 Thus, whether or not a seceding sub-state has a right to selfdetermination can make a massive difference on its success. In practice
it appears, however, that the likelihood of a sub-state having the right
to secede depends almost entirely on which variety of self-determination
is being sought.
External self-determination tends to give clearer results. This is the
type of self-determination used in the aftermath of World War I, and
later in the decolonization period. In determining whether Quebec had a
right to secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that a
right of secession in a colonial context has been accepted by
international law. 114 The Canadian court identified two scenarios where
a right to self-determination and secession may exist outside the
colonial context. The first scenario is alien subjugation, domination, or
exploitation. 115 This position is backed by the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, which provides in relevant part: "subjugation of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of
110.
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the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is
116
contrary to the Charter."
The second scenario is when a people is blocked from exercising
internal self-determination in a meaningful way. 117 In this respect, a
sub-state is entitled to secession only if the mother state refuses to
respect the right to internal self-determination. 118 The Canadian court
found that the Vienna Declaration gave some support to this option by
requiring that governments "represent the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction of any kind." 119
With the end of most colonies, these two non-colonial scenarios are
the most likely outcomes for sub-states seeking a right of secession.
Unfortunately, non-colonial movements are not afforded the privilege
that comes with the colonial context; in fact, the opposite appears to be
true. 120 This presumption against secession resonates with Emerson and
Eagleton's view that "peoples" refers to "colonized peoples." In their
eyes, the right to self-determination, and any secession rights that came
with it, ended along with colonization. 121
However, as stated above, the United Nations tolerates the
ambiguity surrounding this field of law. It also waffles on the issue. In
some cases, such as Katanga and the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, the United Nations has condemned secession. 122 In other cases,
such as Biafra and Bangladesh, the United Nations simply looked the
other way. 123 In fact, the United Nations has even "rewarded" the
following seceding states with membership: Bangladesh, Eritrea, Israel,
and the nations rising out of Yugoslavia. 124 The United Nations has
allowed secessions to occur, implying it does not view secession as
inherently illegal125-or at least that it does not consistently think so. In
addition, the Committee on Human Rights has fostered the idea that
self-determination may still apply outside the colonial context, and it
appears that the idea is slowly gaining ground. 126
The United Nations seems to recognize three limits to secession.
The first limitation is the rule of territorial integrity. United Nations
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General Assembly Res. 1514(XV), paragraph 6, states any attempt
aimed at the disruption of partial or total territorial integrity is
incompatible with the United Nations Charter.127 Interestingly, the
International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on Kosovo,
controversially stated the rule of territorial integrity was confined to
relations between states, which implied sub-states were not bound by
the rule. 128 The second limitation is that, for the purposes of the United
Nations Charter, "peoples" refers to all people in a state as opposed to
the various ethnic groups in that state. 129 Thus, ethnic minorities do not
have the right to self-determination, and by extension, secession.130
Third and finally,the United Nations is generally more open to secession
when the people wishing to secede are oppressed by their mother
state. 131
This muddled international legal theory results in a strong
presumption against a right of secession existing when issues of
internal self-determination arise. 132 This presumption is fueled by
concerns for territorial integrity: a fear that the number of ethnic
conflicts would increase if a general right to secede was made explicit
and that premature recognition of a seceding state would offend the
mother state's sovereignty. 133
D. Overcoming the Presumption
The presumption against a right of secession is strong, but
rebuttable. Fortunately, the method of rebuttal is relatively simple
compared to the previous questions in this paper. The most effective
way to rebut the presumption against secession is to gain international
recognition. Weller claims a state can secede without a right to selfdetermination because the existence of a state is a matter of fact. 134
Effective existence is a classic criterion of statehood; even if it were a
matter of law, it has been denied that criteria other than effectiveness
exists. 135 In fact, it is not even certain that self-determination is a
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criterion for statehood. 136 Despite that bold proclamation, recognition is
a way to achieve self-determination and statehood, especially
considering the lack of explicit rule on the former. 137
The Montevideo Convention lists four criteria for achieving
statehood: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government,
and the capacity to enter into international relations. 138 None of these
criteria are absolute. Some states, such as Israel, have disputed their
borders for years and do not have a defined territory. 139 Refugee crises
have dramatically shifted populations in states such as Iraq and
Sudan. 140 Afghanistan did not have a stable government during the
1990s. 141 And some very small nations, such as Monaco and various
Pacific islands, have depended on nearby states for defense and trade. 142
Yet none of the above examples resulted in a loss of statehood. 143 The
variable nature of these criteria has likely led other scholars to believe
these criteria, while still necessary, are insufficient. 144 In response, they
have considered additional requirements, such as independence,
willingness to observe international law, and, in some cases,
recognition. 145 Because of the inconsistency of how the criteria are
satisfied, it may be best to think of them as factors rather than
elements. It should also be noted that statehood is not recognition, but
recognition can help achieve statehood.
Another avenue for recognition is to become a member of the
United Nations. United Nations membership is open to "all peace-loving
States that accept the obligations contained in the United Nations
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization are able to carry out
these obligations." 146 This is a fairly broad requirement, but the final
decision is up to the General Assembly.
The process is relatively simple. First, the prospective member
submits an application to the Secretary General along with a letter
formally stating that the state accepts the obligations of membership. 147
Second, the Security Council considers the application. Nine out of the
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fifteen members must vote in favor, and none of the five permanent
members-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States-must vote against the state. 148 If the Security Council approves,
it makes a recommendation to the General Assembly. 149 If two-thirds of
the assembly vote in favor of the state, it becomes a member of the
United Nations. 150 The requirements for joining the United Nations are
not the same as the requirements for statehood. However, the United
Nations will only accept entities that it considers to be states. 151
Recognition by other states is policy-driven. 152 While membership
to the United Nations and meeting the criteria for statehood help a new
state's case, an existing state is not required to recognize the new state
(although states can be compelled not to recognize a state). 153 If a
seceding state can be recognized-whether by meeting the criteria for
statehood or joining the United Nations-the secession will likely be
accepted, and the new state will join its place in the international
community.
E. Sui Generis:An Alternative with Dangerous Precedent
If recognition and the blessing of international or state law fail,
there is another concept that could allow a seceding state to gain its
independence: sui generis, "of its own kind." 154 The concept was
famously used during the resolution of Kosovo's independence. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in violation of the United
Nations Charter's provisions against the use of force, bombarded Serbia
to halt human rights violations against Kosovan Albanians. 155 NATO's
actions presented international lawyers with a difficult decision: uphold
the letter of international law and let innocent Kosovan Albanians die
156
Some
or ignore the Charter's prohibitions on force and save lives.
international lawyers chose a third option: declare Kosovo to be sui
generis, thus allowing for the nobility of stopping a human rights
violation while simultaneously showing nominal respect to international
law. 157 Kosovo's declaration of independence was accepted with the
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same logic. 158 Despite claims that a sui generis case would not set a
precedent, 159 other cases will surely attempt to exploit it once it
circumvents international law. Russia already used similar reasoning in
its annexation of Crimea. 160
The International Court of Justice, by contrast, refused to label
Kosovo a sui generis case.161 The Court opted to examine Kosovo's
declaration of independence under international law and set a precedent
of its own: international law cannot be circumvented when it is
convenient.16 2 Given the highly controversial nature of the Kosovo crisis,
sui generis as a means of secession is technically possible but by far the
most unlikely to succeed.
F "The South is My Country": InternationalSecession
With the law now explained, let us return to the hypothetical in
which "The South is My Country" unilaterally secedes from Brazil. How
will this secession fare under international law? As before, the prospects
do not look promising for the southern movement.
Based on the above discussion and explanation, "The South is My
Country's" situation is one of self-determination. Corruption and
potential taxation without representation are certainly not ideal, but
they do not meet the three cases in which a right to secession may be
acknowledged. The southern states' colonial ties are to European
nations who have long abandoned colonization-Germany and Italy.
There is not alien subjugation outside a colonial context. Finally, there
is no deprivation of internal self-determination, or at least none
sufficient enough for international law. Given the lack of accepted
contexts for secession, it is very likely international law would view
"The South is My Country's" secession as illegal.
Hypothetically, suppose the separatist movement continued despite
international law. The next step would be to obtain recognition and
statehood.
"The South is My Country" currently meets two of the four factors
of the Montevideo criteria; specifically, it has a defined territory and a
permanent population. The movement has neither a government nor a
majority of southern Brazilian support. Additionally, the southern
states are wealthy, but there are a variety of functions that the south
does not yet carry out. Unlike Catalonia, the southern states do not
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have much experience in autonomy, aside from a brief ten-year
revolution.
Membership in the United Nations could be the easiest route for
"The South is My Country." The initial requirement of accepting
international law obligations is a fairly low bar. But, in this
hypothetical, "The South is My Country" has illegally seceded, which
would almost certainly cast doubt on its promise to follow international
law. On the other hand, Brazil is not currently on the Security
Council, 16 3 (and neither is Spain) which would almost certainly vote
against a separatist movement inspired by Catalonia. 16 4 However,
Brazil's last term on the Security Council was in 2010-2011: Brazil has
been a frequent member having served ten terms in the past, all
roughly five years apart. 165 There is a high probability Brazil could be
appointed to the Security Council again in the near future. If Brazil
could turn other members against "The South is My Country," the
situation would not be good for the fledgling state. As for the General
Assembly vote, most states arise out of humanitarian crises, and there
would not be one here. 166 Even Kosovo's humanitarian crisis did not
guarantee its successful independence! If a clear human rights case like
Kosovo can have a hard time, "The South is My Country's" lack of
humanitarian issues would likely not receive sympathy or recognition
from other states.
CONCLUSION

Even in the most generous circumstances available, "The South is
My Country's" odds of seceding from Brazil are low. Brazilian law
ensures that the separatist movement will not get very far.
International law disfavors unilateral secession except for the most
extreme situations. Achieving recognition and statehood is an
inconsistent process with no clear indicators to project success. For now,
all "The South is My Country" can do is poll its fellow Brazilians and see
if other movements such as Catalonia can generate more interest in
their movement. Perhaps the surge of nationalism will pass, or perhaps
we will see an independent southern Brazil before the next century.
Only time will tell.
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